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PAGE 1 OF 22

PAGE 01 STATE 140893

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P-03 RSC-01 USIA-12 PRS-01 NMCC-00 PM-05 ACDA-19 /115 R

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USDEL FRANCE

CINCPAC

HICOMRY

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FOLLOWING FYI ONLY ARE EXCERPTS FROM BACKGROUNDER BY HENRY KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND JOSEPH J. SISCO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEA EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS AT 10:04 A.M., EDT, MONDAY, AUGUST 24, 1970, AT THE WHITE HOUSE (SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA).

IT MAY BE ATTRIBUTED TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
DIRECT QUOTATION IS NOT PERMITTED.

BEGIN TEXT

NOW LET ME MAKE SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT VIETNAM
AND THEN A FEW CONCLUDING ONES.

THE TROUBLE WITH VIETNAM IS THAT THE DEBATE
ABOUT IT HAS ACHIEVED AN ALMOST LITURGICAL QUALITY. WORDS
LIKE "COALITION GOVERNMENT," "CEASE FIRE" HAVE DEVELOPED

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A LIFE OF THEIR OWN. AND EVERY ONCE IN A WHILE THE WASHINGTON PRESS CORPS AND VARIOUS SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES RUN AROUND THE TRACK A FEW TIMES ON THE THEORY THAT THEY MIGH JUST CATCH US UNAWARE IN SAYING A WORD THAT WE DON'T INTEND TO SAY AND BEAT US OVER THE HEAD WITH IT FOR THE NEXT THREE WEEKS.

BUT THE PROBLEM ABOUT THE VIETNAM DEBAT IS THAT MOST OF THE BASIC ARGUMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE VERY OFTEN.

WE INHERITED THE WAR, IT IS SOMETIMES FORGOTTEN, IN ITS FIFTH YEAR, WHEN THERE WERE 540,000 AMERICAN FORCES IN VIETNAM, AT A TIME WHEN THERE DID NOT EXIST A PROGRAM FOR WITHDRAWAL, AT A MOMENT WHEN THERE DID NOT EXIST A PROGRAM FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AT A MOMENT WHEN IT WASN'T EVEN CLEAR YET WHETHER AND HOW WE WOULD TALK TO THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OR WHAT ITS ROLE IN THE FUTURE POLITICAL LIFE OF VIETNAM MIGHT BE.

NOW TO TURN AROUND A PROCESS THAT HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR FIVE YEARS IS QUITE A DIFFERENT MATTER FROM STARTING A NEW POLICY. THIS ADMINISTRATION WAS NOT GIVEN THE OPTION OF DECIDING WHETHER WE WANTED TO HAVE THESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. WE FOUND THEM THERE AND THAT CREATED ITS OWN REALITY.

WE HAD TO MAKE OUR POLICY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT HOWEVER WE GOT INVOLVED IN SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD AFFECT THE PEACE OF THE WORLD AND PERHAPS THE DOMESTIC STABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID VERY OFTEN THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EASY FOR HIM TO GET OUT IN THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION AND TO BLAME EVERYTHING ON HIS PREDECESSORS. BUT THAT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN, IN HIS JUDGMENT, IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST.

IF THE UNITED STATES HAD LIQUIDATED THE WAR IN A MANNER THAT WOULD HAVE APPEARED LIKE A COMPLETE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN WILL, IT WOULD HAVE CREATED SUCH AN IMBALANCE AROUND THE WORLD THAT, IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE PROSPECT

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WE HAVE NEVER MET, IN THE WHITE HOUSE, ANY FOREIGN LEADER, CERTAINLY NEVER ANY LEADER FROM ASIAN COUNTRIES, WHO URGED US TO LIQUIDATE THE WAR QUICKLY. THERE MAY OR MAY NOT BE A MOMINO EFFECT. OF COURSE, LET ME MAKE IT CLEAR: OF COURSE, THEY WANT US TO LIQUIDATE THE WAR QUICKLY. THEY JUST DON'T WANT US TO LOSE IT.

BUT I DON'T EVEN WANT TO PUT THE ISSUE IN TERMS OF WINNING AND LOOSING FOR THE UNITED STATES. I WANT TO PUT THE ISSUE IN TERMS OF HOW WE CAN END THE WAR UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH GIVE US THE GREATEST CHANCES FOR PEACE AND THE GREATEST CHANCES FOR DOMESTIC STABILITY.

NOW, WE CHOSE THE COURSE ON WHICH WE ARE AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE WAR THERE WERE NO BRILLIANT CHOICES LEFT AND THAT ANYONE TAKING THE NEGATIVE OF ANY POLICY, INCLUDING THE POLICY THEY WERE RECOMMENDING, WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY PUNCHING HOLES IN IT. I CAN SAY ANYONE TAKING THE NEGATIVE TOWARDS ANY POLICY, EVEN THE ONES THEY ARE RECOMMENDING, I CAN SAY THAT WITH SOME ASSURANCE BECAUSE IF YOU READ WHAT PEOPLE WERE RECOMMENDING IN 1968, WHAT OPPONENTS OF THE WAR WERE RECOMMENDING IN 1968, YOU WILL FIND THAT THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT WE HAVE BEEN CARRYING OUT.

IF YOU READ WHAT SENATOR KENNEDY, FOR EXAMPLE, SAID IN AUGUST, 1968, IN WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS, WHEN HE SAID HE WAS PICKING UP THE FALLEN BANNER OF HIS BROTHER AS A DECLARATION OF CONSCIENCE AGAINST THE VIETNAM WAR, YOU WILL FIND THAT MOST OF THE PRESCRIPTIONS IN HIS SPEECH HAVE BEEN EXCEEDED, NOT JUST CARRIED OUT.

LET ME MAKE A FEW GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. WE ARE ATTEMPTING, CONSISTENT WITH THE NIXON DOCTRINE, TO TURN OVER THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND EVENTUALLY THE EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. NOW IT ISN'T TOO DIFFICULT TO SHOW MANY OF THE THINGS THAT HAVE GONE WRONG WITH PREVIOUS PROGRAMS -- AND ANYONE WHO HAS SEEN PREVIOUS PROGRAMS KNOWS THAT THERE ARE MANY PROBLEMS THAT CAN ARISE IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

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OUR PROBLEM IS THIS: PEOPLE SAY, "WHO DO YOU ENGAGE IN VIETNAMIZATION? WHY DON'T YOU NEGOTIATE?"

FIRST OF ALL, WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO NEGOTIATE. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO NEGOTIATE. AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WHEN THE FULL HISTORY OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS REVEALED WE WILL HAVE NOTHING TO APOLOGIZE FOR.

BUT, MOST IMPORTANLTY, IF VIETNAMIZATION DOESN'T SUCCEED, NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT SUCCEED EITHER. IF HANOI IS CONVINCED THAT THE POLICY WE ARE PURSUING UNILATERALLY IN VIETNAM IS DOOMED, IT HAS ABSOLUTELY NO INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE, SO THAT THEN THE ONLY CHOICE IS BETWEEN GETTING OUT IMMEDIATELY OR GETTING OUT OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME.

IF WE CHOOSE THE NON-PRECIPITATE ROUTE OF WITHDRAWAL, WE HAVE TO TRY TO MAKE VIETNAMIZATION WORK. AND, MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE, PARTLY AS A RESULT OF THE CAMBODIAN EXERCISE, THAT VIETNAMIZATION IS WORKING WELL ENOUGH TO GIVE US AT LEAST THE POSSIBILITY OF PURSUING THE COURSE ON WHICH WE ARE.

THERE ARE MANY OTHER IDEAS. FOR EXAMPLE, MAY SUGGESTIONS ARE, "WHO DON'T YOU GIVE A DEADLINE FOR WITHDRAWAL?" WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT WE WOULD ACHIEVE BY SUCH A DEADLINE. THE HISTORY OF OUR DOMESTIC OPPOSITION HAS MADE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT EVERY PROPOSAL, ADOPTING THE PROPOSAL OF EVEN SOME LEADING NEWSPAPERS, DOES NOT NECESSARILY GUARANTEE CONTINUED SUPPORT. USUALLY THE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION HAS THEN SHIFTED TO SOME OTHER ISSUE. AND IF WE GAVE AN 18 MONTHS SCHEDULE PEOPLE WOULD SOON ARGUE ABOUT 16 MONTHS, 12 MONTHS, EIGHT MONTHS. THAT ISN'T THE ISSUE; THAT ISN'T THE PROGRAM.

THE MAJOR PROBLEM IS THAT IF WE GAVE A SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD STOP. IF WE TOLD HANOI THAT NO MATTER WHAT THEY DID WE WOULD WITHDRAW BY A FIXED DATE, THERE WOULD BE NO INCENTIVE HANOI COULD POSSIBLY HAVE TO NEGOTIATE. THEY WOULD SIMPLY WAIT FOR THAT DAY TO HAPPEN.

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SCHEDULE IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO ANNOUNCE IT AHEAD OF TIME. THAT DOESN'T MEAN THAT WE DON'T WANT TO WITHDRAW. IT SIMPLY MEANS THAT IF WE WANT THE NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCEED, WE HAVE TO HAVE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FLEXIBILITY IN OUR TACTICS. INDEED, OUR DELIEMMA IS THIS: THAT WITHOUT SOME DEGREE OF AMBIGUITY IN OUR POSTURE, THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN ADVANCING. AND YET, WITH TOO MUCH AMBIGUITY, OUR DOMESTIC SUPPORT WILL ERODE. THIS IS THE AREA IN WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO NAVIGATE.

WE BELIEVE IN NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE IT IS THE ONLY RELIABLE QUICK WAY OF ENDING THE WAR. THE REASON WE HAVE NOT DONE SOME OF THE THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED IS NOT BECAUSE THE IDEAS ARE BAD. IT IS NOT BECAUSE WE DON'T WANT TO GET OUT. BUT IT IS, RATHER, THAT WE WANT TO ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING OUT, PERHAPS FASTER, UNDER CONDITIONS, THOUGH, OF A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

NOW, MANY SAY, "WHY WOULD THE OTHER SIDE NEGOTIATE?" IT COULD BE THAT THE OTHER SIDE WILL NEVER NEGOTIATE NO MATTER WHAT WE DO. BUT LOOKING AT THE SITUATION, THEY CAN SEE SOUTH VIETNAM GAINING IN STRENGTH; MABY NOT ABLE TO HOLD EVERY LAST PROVINCE, BUT ABLE TO CONTROL ENOUGH OF THEIR TERRITORY TO POSE QUITE A PROBLEM.

SECONDLY, THEY SEE THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT POTENTIALLY THREATENING EVERYTHING THEY HAVE FOUGHT FOR FOR 20 YEARS.

THIRDLY, THEY MAY FEEL THAT THE TIME TO GET A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS WHILE THERE WAS STILL ENOUGH OF ANY AMERICAN PRESENCE TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME.

BUT, WHATEVER THE REASON, WHATEVER THEIR REASONS, OUR POSITION HAS TO BE CLEAR. WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE AND WE ARE EAGER TO NEGOTIATE. BUT THE THING WE CANNOT DO IS SPEND ALL OUR ENERGY NEGOTIATING WITH OURSELVES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCUSSION A THEORY HAS DEVELOPED ACCORDING TO WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE LIKE A DETECTIVE STORY IN WHICH THEY THROW OUT VAGUE CLUES AND WE HAVE TO GUESS AT THE ANSWER. THEN, IF WE SOMEHOW MISS THE ANSWER, ACCORDING TO THE FOLKLORE, WE ARE APPROVED FOR RELEASE 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070014-4

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WE GET ALL SORTS OF PROPOSITIONS OF "WHY DON'T YOU PROPOSE THIS OR THAT," AND PEOPLE SAY THEY KNOW THIS IS GOING TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS GO.

LET ME REMIND YOU, IT USED TO BE SAID THAT IF THE BOMBINGS STOPPED THERE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, IF WE TALKED TO THE NLF THERE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, IF WE HAD A TOKEN WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS THERE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, IF WE ANNOUNCED THE WITHDRAWAL OF 100,000 TROOPS, IF WE WITHDREW 100,000 TROOPS, IF WE SENT A SENIOR AMBASSADOR TO PARIS.

WE HAVE DONE ALL THESE THINGS AND THERE HAVE NOT YET BEEN SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THERE HAS NOT BEEN FOR ONE REASON, PRIMARILY: THAT HANOI HAS BELIEVED, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF OUR DOMESTIC DEBATE, THAT THEY COULD SELL THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER AND OVER AND OVER AGAIN SO THAT THEY NEVER HAVE TO NEGOTIATE, SO THAT THEY GET EVERYTHING THEY WANT AS AN ENTRANCE PRICE INTO NEGOTIATION -- SOMETHING THAT USED TO BE CALLED UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER.

THIS IS THE ONLY THING THAT WE ARE RESISTING. IF HANOI ENTERS INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH US IT CAN BE SURE THAT IT WILL FIND US FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE. WE HAVE NEVER OFFERED OUR PROPOSALS ON A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS.

WHEN THE PRESIDENT WAS OUT HERE ON APRIL 20 TO MAKE HIS SPEECH ANNOUNCING THE LATEST WITHDRAWAL, THE OVERALL WITHDRAWAL FIGURE OF 150,000, HE LAID DOWN THREE PRINCIPLES OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH OUGHT TO GIVE THE BASIS FOR A FAIR SOLUTION.

THE MISSING INGREDIENT HAS NOT BEEN LACK OF INGENUITY IN COMING UP WITH THIS OR THAT GIMMICK TO GET THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED; THE MISSING INGREDIENT HAS BEEN THAT HANOI, THE HANOI LEADERSHIP, WHICH MAY BE THE LAST TRUE LENINISTS IN THE WORLD, HAVE NOT FOUND IT EASY TO CONVEIVE A SOLUTION OTHER THAN A COMPLETE TAKEOVER; BEAUSE APPROVED FOR RELEASE 2003/03/25 : CIA RDP72-00327R000300070014-4

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PAGE 07 STATE 140893

OF POLITICAL POWER IS NOT THE MOST OBVIOUS CONCLUSION
TO WHICH YOU ARE DRIVEN BY THE STUDY OF COMMUNIST THEORY.

THIS HAS BEEN THE PROBLEM THAT WE HAVE HAD AND IF
WE EVER GET OVER THIS HURDLE WE BELIEVE THAT THE SETTLEMENT
CAN BE FAIRLY QUICKLY ACHIEVED.

NOW LET ME JUST MAKE TWO OR THREE MORE VERY QUICK
OBSERVATIONS ABOUT VIETNAM. PEOPLE SAY, "YOU ARE DEPENDENT
ON THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT." AND THE NICE DEMOGOGIC ANSWER
WOULD BE TO SAY, "NO, WE ARE NOT AT ALL DEPENDENT. WE DO
WHAT WE WANT AND THEY DO WHAT THEY WANT."

NO ONE COULD TAKE THAT SERIOUSLY. WE ARE
FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM. OF COURSE WE ARE TO SOME
EXTENT INFLUENCED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. BUT
IF WHAT I SAID ABOUT THE NIXON DOCTRINE IS TRUE, THEN IT IS
ALSO CORRECT THAT WHAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO IS TO
MAKE OURSELVES INCREASINGLY INDEPENDENT AND TO GIVE THEM
AN INCREASING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN FUTURE AND
EVENTUALLY EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN FUTURE.

THIS IS WHAT WE HAVE GONE VERY FAR TOWARDS
BRINGING ABOUT. AFTER ALL, WE WILL HAVE WITHDRAWN
OVER 260,000 TROOPS BY NEXT SPRING, OR DURING NEXT SPRING;
BUT WE ARE NOT THERE YET.

SECONDLY, TO WHAT EXTEND ARE WE DEPENDENT ON HANOI?
AGAIN, THIS GETS BACK TO THE PROBLEM THAT I DESCRIBED
BEFORE. THE ONLY WAY WE CAN MAKE OURSELVES COMPLETELY
INDEPENDENT OF HANOI IS JUST TO GET OUT. HANOI HAS TO
BELIEVE THAT TO SOME EXTENT ITS ACTIONS WILL INFLUENCE
OURS, OR WE ARE GOING TO GIVE IT AN INCENTIVE TO ESCALATE.

AND THIS IS WHY THE PRESIDENT HAS IN EVERY MAJOR
STATEMENT POINTED OUT TO HANOI THAT IF THEY TOOK
ADVANTAGE OF OUR POLICY BY INCREASING THE RISKS TO AMERICAN
LIVES, WE WOULD BE FORCED TO TAKE SOME ACTION.

BUT, AGAIN, WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO GET INTO A
POSITION WHERE THE PROBABILITY OF THIS THREAT HAVING TO
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THEN LET ME JUST MAKE ONE FINAL POINT HAVING TO DO WITH OUR DOMESTIC SITUATION. I SAID THAT THE WAR IN VIETNAM IS A VERY ANGUISHING PROBLEM AND WE ARE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE CONCERN OF SOME OF OUR MOST DEDICATED PEOPLE WITH THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON AMERICAN SOCIETY. BUT WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE PEOPLE DO NOT FORGIVE THEIR LEADERS IF THEIR LEADERS PRODUCE DISASTERS, EVEN IF THESE DISASTERS WERE CARRYING OUT THE WISHES OF THE PUBLIC. IT DID NOT SAVE CHAMBERLAIN OR CHAMBERLAIN'S HISTORIC REPUTATION, THAT IN 1938 85 PERCENT OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE SUPPORTED THE MUNICH AGREEMENT AND THAT CHURCHILL WAS IN A MINISCULE MINORITY, BUT THE CONSEQUENCE OF IT BECAME APPARENT.

WE CANNOT CONDUCT OUR POLICY IN RESPONSE TO DEMONSTRATIONS BY PEOPLE WHO SMASH THE CHINA IN THE CHINA SHOP AND THEN SAY, "LOOK WHAT YOU HAVE MADE ME DO." THEY HAVE TO HAVE SOME BETTER REASONS THAN THAT.

WE BELIEVE ABOUT MAY OF THE RADICAL GROUPS WHO FEEL SO INTENSELY ABOUT THE WAR, THAT IF WE REACH A SITUATION WHERE POLICY IS MADE IN THE STREETS, IT WILL NOT BE UPPER MIDDLE-CLASS COLLEGE KIDS WHO TAKE OVER THE COUNTRY BUT SOME MORE PRIMITIVE AND ELEMENTAL GROUP.

WE CONSIDER OURSELVES THE BEST PROTECTION OF SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO ARE MOST VOCAL AGAINST US. NO ONE CAN BE MORE INTERESTED IN A RECONCILIATION OF SOCIETY THAN THE PRESIDENT. NO ONE CAN POSSIBLY BELIEVE THAT IT COULD CONCEIVABLY BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO HAVE YET ANOTHER ADMINISTRATION DESTROYED BY A CREDIBILITY GAP, NOT OUT OF ANY PARTISAN CONSIDERATIONS BUT BECAUSE THAT WOULD MEAN THAT FOR TWELVE YEARS THIS COUNTRY HAS NOT HAD A LEADERSHIP THAT WAS CONSIDERED LEGIMATE BY A VAST SEGMENT OF ITS POPULATION.

THIS IS WHY WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE TO GO ON A COURSE WHICH HOLDS TOGETHER AS MANY OF OUR PEOPLE AS WE CAN, IN WHICH THE END OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM IS DONE THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY, AND NOT THROUGH VIOLENCE, AND IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS GIVEN ENOUGH LEEWAY TO CARRY OUT ITS POLICY

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WE ARE GOING TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM. NO ONE CAN HAVE ANY REAL DOUBT THAT AN ADMINISTRATION THAT HAS TAKEN THE STEPS THAT WE HAVE, THAT HAS KEPT EVERY PROMISE THAT WE HAVE MADE, WOULD FAIL TO MEET THIS SO OFTEN REITERATED PROMISE OF ENDING THE WAR. BUT WE HAVE GOT TO DO IT IN A WAY SO THAT PEOPLE WILL BE PROUD OF IT AFTERWARDS, AND NOT JUST GRAB FOR HEADLINES WHILE WE ARE DOING IT.

Q DR. KISSINGER, YOU SAY THAT THE MAJOR CONFRONTATION IS NO LONGER BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA, BUT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA. THAT BEING THE CASE, WHAT HOPE CAN WE HAVE THAT WE CAN GET RUSSIA TO DIMINISH ITS PRODUCTION OF ARMS WHEN IT IS WORRIED ABOUT CHINA AND CHINA CERTAINLY WON'T NEGOTIATE THAT POINT?

DR. KISSINGER: LET ME MAKE THIS REMARK A LITTLE CLEAKER. FIRST OF ALL, THERE IS, OF COURSE, STILL A SIGNIFICANT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIET UNION. BUT I THINK THE INTENSITY OF EMOTION THAT IS PRODUCED BY THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA EXCEEDS THE INTENSITY OF FEELING OF THAT BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND US.

AFTER ALL, IT IS AN EERIE FEELING TO HAVE A FOUR- THOUSAND MILE FRONTIER WITH 800 MILLION PEOPLE ON THE OTHER SIDE, WITH BIG CHUNKS OF THAT TERRITORY SHOWN IN HIGH SCHOOL HISTORY BOOKS ALL OVER CHINA AS BEING PART OF CHINA, AND WITH OCCASIONAL BORDER CLASHES, AND WITH THAT COUNTRY DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

NOW, THE MAJOR NEGOTIATION THAT WE ARE CONDUCTING WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAS TO DO WITH THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC ARMS, THE SOVIET UNION IS ENORMOUSLY AHEAD OF ANYTHING THAT COMMUNIST CHINA CAN POSSIBLY HOPE TO ACHIEVE OVER, SAY, A TEN TO FIFTEEN YEAR PERIOD.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS WELL OVER 1000 LAND BASED MISSILES. COMMUNIST CHINA DOESN'T HAVE ANY INTERCONTINENTAL ROCKETS, YET. IT HAS WELL BELOW 100 OF THE MEDIUM RANGE -- WELL BELOW FIFTY.

SO, AT THIS MOMENT, THIS IS NOT A THREAT THAT THEY CANNOT HANDLE.

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PAGE 10 STATE 140893

CAN AFFORD TO ACCEPT THE SORT OF PROPOSAL WE HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT WITHOUT AFFECTING THEIR SECURITY SITUATION VIS-A-VIS COMMUNIST CHINA, ESPECIALLY IF THEY RETAIN AN ABM DEFENSE FOR MOSCOW AND THAT AREA.

HOWEVER, I THINK YOU HAVE CALLED ATTENTION TO A VERY IMPORTANT PROBLEM. FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD, IF THESE RIVALRIES CONTINUE, AS ONE HAS TO ASSUME THEY MAY, SAY 15 YEARS FROM NOW, AS COMMUNIST CHINA MOVES INTO THE GREAT POWER CLASS, IF COMMUNIST CHINA REFUSES TO JOIN ANY DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT, THEN WE WILL FACE A SITUATION WHERE CERTAINLY THE SOVIET UNION, AND PROBABLY BOTH OF US, MAY FIND THAT WE HAVE TO REASSESS THE WHOLE ISSUE.

THIS IS ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO THE GROWING NUMBER OF NUCLEAR COUNTRIES. SO, YOU HAVE CALLED ATTENTION NOT TO A PROBLEM NOW, BUT WHAT THIS AGREEMENT CAN DO IS TO GIVE US MAYBE 15 YEARS. IN ANY CASE, THERE WILL BE PROVISIONS FOR RE-EXAMINATION EVERY FIVE YEARS, EVEN IN TERMS OF THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES.

Q DR. KISSINGER, VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW WAS SOMEWHAT EXUBERANT, IT SEEMS, FROM WHAT WE HEAR IN HIS STATEMENT IN GUAM ABOUT OUR SUPPORT OF CAMBODIA. COULD YOU EXPLAIN, HAS THERE BEEN A CHANGE IN OUR GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IN TERMS OF HOW FAR WE WILL SUPPORT THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT? AND WHAT IS YOUR ESTIMATE FOR THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT?

DR. KISSINGER: I HAVEN'T READ THE ACTUAL TEXT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT. AS I UNDERSTOOD WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS SAYING, IT WAS A STATEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION POLICY WHICH IS THAT WE WILL SUPPORT THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT IN ITS ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALITY.

BUT THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVENTS IN CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM. THIS RELATIONSHIP HAS A MUCH BIGGER CUSHION NOW BECAUSE OF THE SUPPLIES WE HAVE PICKED UP IN THE SANCTUARIES.

FOR EXAMPLE, IF IN APRIL CAMBODIA HAD BEEN TAKEN OVER AND THEN THE COMMUNISTS, BASED ON THE SANCTUARIES AND ON THE APPROVED RELEASE 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-O0337R000300070014-4

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VIETNAM, THE SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT IS TODAY. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVENTS IN CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM. WE WILL DO WHAT WE CAN WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE, AS I EXPLAINED IT THIS MORNING, TO MAINTAIN THE INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALITY OF CAMBODIA.

WE HAVE ANNOUNCED A MODEST MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. WE ARE ENCOURAGING OTHER COUNTRIES TO DO THE SAME. AND THAT IS THE POLICY THAT WE HAVE ANNOUNCED? THAT IS THE POLICY THAT WE ARE FOLLOWING; AND THAT IS THE POLICY THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS STATING.

LET ME RESTATE WHAT I SAID THIS MORNING, HOWEVER, ONE OF THE ASPECTS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE IS THAT HENCEFORETH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS CANNOT CONVINCE US THAT THEIR SECURITY IS MORE IN OUR INTEREST THAN IN THEIRS.

Q I ASKED, ALSO WHAT ARE YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT HOW LON NOL WILL DO, OR IS DOING?

DR. KISSINGER: LET ME MAKE TWO COMMENTS ABOUT THIS.

FIRST, THERE IS A TENDENCY WHENEVER ONE TALKS ABOUT FOREIGN CRISES TO PERSONALIZE THE THING, TO SAY IT IS "THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT."

FIRST OF ALL, LET'S UNDERSTAND WHO LON NOL IS. THE NOL NOL GOVERNMENT IS THE SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT MINUS SIHANOUK. THIS IS NOT A GROUP OF OUTSIDERS WHO CAME IN THERE AND OVERTHREW THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT; THIS IS THE GOVERNMENT THAT SIHANOUK APPOINTED, THAT HE LEFT BEHIND WHEN HE WENT OFF TO FRANCE FOR TWO MONTHS, AND LON NOL AND MATAK, THE TWO KEY PEOPLE, ARE HIS APPOINTMENTS. THEY ARE NOT USURPERS.

SECONDLY, THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT HAPPENS TO BE THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT. WE ARE NOT SUPPORTING INDIVIDUALS. WE ARE SUPPORTING ANY GOVERNMENT IN CAMBODIA THAT WILL ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALITY.

NOW, WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL? WHEN

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AREAS ALL ALONG THE CAMBODIAN FRONTIER, THE CAMBODIAN-VIETNAMESE FRONTIER. THESE PEOPLE HAD STARTED MOVING INTO CAMBODIA, AND SOME OF THEM, AT THE TIME OF OUR ACTIONS INTO THE SANCTUARIES, WERE ATTACKING TOWNS AROUND PHNOM PENH AT DISTANCES OF ANYWHERE FROM 10 TO 20 MILES. AND THEY WERE MOVING ALSO TOWARDS THE COASTAL PORTS.

THERE IS A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT IF WE HAD NOT MOVED INTO THE SANCTUARIES, THE COMMUNISTS WOULD HAVE TAKEN OVER AT LEAST ALL OF THE EASTERN HALF OF CAMBODIA, OPENED A SUPPLY LINE TO THE SEA AND THEN USED CAMBODIA AS A BASE FOR RENEWED ATTACKS ON VIETNAM WHICH, WITH THE SUPPLIES THAT WERE IN THE SANCTUARIES, WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY TOUGH, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO DEAL WITH IF WE ALSO WERE WITHDRAWING FORCES.

SO, AT THAT TIME, WHEN WE WENT INTO THE SANCTUARIES THE CHANCES OF THE GOVERNMENT SURVIVING WERE MAYBE ONE IN FOUR. NOW THE CHANCES ARE SOMWHAT BETTER THAN 50-50.

Q HOW MANY COMMUNISTS ARE THERE NOW, DR. KISSINGER? HOW MANY COMMUNISTS TROOPS ARE THERE NOW VOMPARED WITH THE 40,000?

DR. KISSINGER: THEY ACTUALLY HAVEN'T REINFORCED VERY MUCH. THEY HAVE PROBABLY SOMEWHAT LESS THAN THEY HAD BEFORE, WE ESTIMATE THAT WE INFILCTED CASUALTIES OF ABOUT 14,000 ON THEM AND THEY MAY HAVE REINFORCED BY ABOUT 6,000. SO THERE ARE PROBABLY 8,000 LESS THAN THERE WERE THERE BEFORE, THESE ARE NOT FIRM FIGURES, BUT THESE ARE ROUGH ESTIMATES. IT IS STILL IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 35,000 TO 40,000.

MANY OF THE NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN CAMBODIA GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF A CONCERTED OFFENSIVE, OF TERRITORY BEING HELD, BUT MANY OF THE COMMUNISTS' MOVES ARE REALLY MORE IN THE NATURE OF RAID. THEY TAKE A TOWN AND THEN THEY WITHDRAW FROM IT AGAIN. THEY HAVE NOT YET TAKEN AND HELD A MAJOR TOWN, WHICH IS PROVED BY THE FACT THAT SIHANOUK HAS NOT YET MANAGED TO COME BACK INTO CAMBODIA AND REESTABLISH HIS BASE. CIA-RDP72-E037R000300070014-4

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ANY POINT, WHICH WOULD BE VERY MUCH IN HIS INTEREST.

SOME OF OUR CRITICS SAY THAT ONE OF THE RESULTS OF THE INCURSIONS INTO THE SANCTUARIES HAS BEEN THAT THE COMMUNISTS NOW OCCUPY SOME OF THE NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES, BUT THEY WERE OCCUPYING THOSE ANYWAY. THEY DIDN'T TAKE ADDITIONAL TERRITORY AS A RESULT OF THESE INCURSIONS. WHAT THEY DID IS TO HOLD ON TO THE SUPPLY LINES THAT THEY HAD AND TO RUN RAIDS INTO THE OTHER AREAS.

IF THE COMMUNISTS, AFTER THE RAINY SEASON ENDS IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT OF RESUPPLY AND PUT ALL OF THEIR RESOURCES INTO OVERTHROWING CAMBODIA, THEY COULD PROBABLY GIVE THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT A VERY HARD TIME INDEED.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY WANT TO FIGHT A WAR ON THREE FRONTS, WHEREBY CONCERNTRATING ON CAMBODIA THEY MAY BE TAKING AWAY FURTHER FROM THE EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM, PERMITTING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO CONSOLIDATE ITSELF FURTHER. IN FACT, THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION IS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY WE BELIEVE THAT RATIONAL PEOPLE IN HANOI COULD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THEY ARE BETTER OFF NEGOTIATING.

IF YOU ASK ME FOR AN ESTIMATE, IT IS SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN 50-50, BUT IT IS NOT OVERWHELMING.

Q I HAVE A QUESTION ABOUT THE PACIFIC POLICY FOR DR. KISSINGER.

IF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT UNDERWENT AN INTERNAL CHANGE THAT SEEMED LIKELY TO PRODUCE A COMMUNIST OR A COMMUNIST-LEANING GOVERNMENT, WOULD THE NIXON DOCTRINE APPLY?

DR. KISSINGER: IT ISN'T PART OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE

TO INSTALL NEW GOVERNMENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES WHERE GOVERNMENTS GET IN BY LEGAL PROCESSES. IF THERE WERE A GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES, IF THIS IS WHAT YOU WERE REFERRING TO, THEN WHAT WE WOULD TRY TO DO IS TO APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE.

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OUGHT TO BE FOUGHT SUBSTANTIALLY BY THE COUNTRIES THREATENED,
WITH AMERICAN MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AMERICAN TROOPS LEND
THEMSELVES PARTICULARLY WELL FOR GUERRILLA WARS, BECAUSE
THEY TEND TO GIVE THE OPPOSING SIDE A FOREIGN ENEMY. AND THEY
GIVE THE GOVERNMENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FIGHT IT AS A CONVENTIONAL
WAR. THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY APPLY TO THE PAST IN VIETNAM,
WHICH WAS A COMBINATION OF CONVENTIONAL-GUERRILLA WAR.

IN THE PHILIPPINES, MOREOVER, THE GUERRILLA WAR
CANNOT BE SUSTAINED AS EASILY FROM FOREIGN SANCTUARIES AS
IT COULD IN VIETNAM, SINCE IT IS AN ISLAND.

SO WE BELIEVE THAT IF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT,
WITH OUR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PERHAPS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
WHERE NECESSARY, CANNOT HANDLE ITS OWN GUERRILLAS, AMERICAN
TROOPS WILL PROBABLY NOT BE VERY SUCCESSFUL.

Q I WONDER IF EITHER OF YOU GENTLEMEN HAVE ANY
FEELING THAT RED CHINA MAY INVOLVE ITSELF IN ANY WAY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION AS A BOAT-ROCKER OR SPOILER OR PROBLEM-
CREATOR?

MR. SISCO: WE DO HAVE SOME EVIDENCE OF SOME INFLUENCE
OF RED CHINA ON ONE OF THE MILITANT WINGS OF THE REDAYEEN
MOVEMENT. THE PLP, HEADED BY GEORGE HABBASH, IS WE THINK
SOMEWHAT MAOIST-ORIENTED. WE DO NOT SEE ANY EVIDENCE OF
ANYTHING VERY SUBSTANTIAL GOING FROM RED CHINA TO THIS GROUP.

IT HAS BEEN LARGEY PEOPLE TAKING TRIPS TO PEKING
AND PERHAPS SOME MINIMAL AMOUNTS OF EQUIPMENT. SO IT HAS BEEN
IDEOLOGICAL PRIMARILY.

THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED SOME CONCERN ABOUT THIS.
THERE IS EVIDENCE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE ON OTHER PARTS OF THE
FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, EVIDENCE ALSO OF SOME SUPPORT, INDIRECT AND
OTHERWISE.

BUT ONE OF THE THINGS THAT WE ARE GETTING IN RECENT
DAYS--AND I WOULD JUST PASS THIS ALONG FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH--
IS MORE AND MORE FAR AS I CAN TELL, APPROPRIATELY SPHERICAL

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THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT BE TOO LITERAL IN JUDGING
THAT THE PRESENT FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP IN FACT REALLY REFLECTS
BROADLY THE VIEWS OF THE SO-CALLED PALESTINIANS.

THERE ARE A GOOD MANY ARABS THAT ARE TELLING US
PARTICULARLY IN RECENT DAYS THAT ONE OF THE THINGS WHICH THE
RECENT AMERICAN INITIATIVE HAS UNEARTHED IS A TREMENDOUS
AMOUNT OF DISCUSSION AMONG PALESTINIANS WHO ARE NOT PART OF
THE FEDAYEEN GROUP OR IN FACT ARE NOT REPRESENTED IN ONE
OF THESE 10 OR 11 ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE UNDER THE RUBRIC
ON AN OVERALL BASIS CALLED THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

SO THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF FERMENT GOING ON
IN THE ARAB WORLD NOW, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE INTELLECTUAL
CIRCLES OF MANY OF THE PALESTINIAN GROUPS AND PARTICULARLY
I MIGHT SAY IN LEBANON AND IN JORDAN.

Q I WOULD LIKE TO GET BACK TO MR AGNEW
FOR JUST A MOMENT. HE WAS REPORTED BY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS,
PUBLISHED IN THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, TO HAVE MADE THE STATEMENT
THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO RENDER ALL
POSSIBLE AID TO THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT.

I APPRECIATE THAT DR. KISSINGER HAS NOT HAD A CHANCE
TO READ THE TEXT OF THE ADDRESS OR STATEMENT. BUT IF THIS
TURNS OUT TO HAVE BEEN AN ACCURATE REPORT, WOULD SUCH A
STATEMENT REFLECT OUR NATIONAL POLICY?

DR. KISSINGER: THE STATEMENT THAT WE WILL GIVE ALL
POSSIBLE AID IS PERFECTLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR NATIONAL POLICY.
WE DECIDE WHAT AID IS POSSIBLE. (LAUGHTER) WE HAVE ANNOUNCED
THE AID PROGRAM WHICH WE ARE GOING TO GIVE DURING THE CALENDAR
YEAR OR DURING THIS YEAR, AND THAT WILL BE THE AMOUNT OF DIRECT
AID THAT THEY WILL GET FROM US.

IN ADDITION, WE ARE FLYING INTERCITION MISSIONS IN
CAMBODIA, AND THAT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED/ WE ARE GIVING STRONG
ENCOURAGEMENT TO OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT THE
INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALITY OF CAMBODIA.

THAT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE. WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT
WAS TRYING APPROVED FOR RELEASE 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070014-4

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MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALITY OF CAMBODIA, THAT WE ARE MAKING WHAT EFFORTS ARE POSSIBLE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AS WE HAVE REDIRECTED SOME OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO MAKE THAT POSSIBLE.

WE ARE USING OUR INFLUENCE. BUT HE WAS NOT ANNOUNCING ANY POLICY BEYOND THE ONE THAT WE HAVE ALREADY PROCLAIMED, EXCEPT TO UNDERLINE OUR INTEREST IN THE INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALITY OF CAMBODIA ONCE AGAIN.

Q THEN OUR PRESENT POLICY IS TO RENDER ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA?

DR. KISSINGER: YOU KNOW WHEN YOU SAY "ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE"---

Q MR AGNEW SAYS IT.

DR. KISSINGER: YES, BUT YOU CAN INTERPRET ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO MEAN WE WILL SEND IN TROOPS, THERE IS NO LIMIT TO WHAT WE ARE GOING TO DO, OR YOU CAN INTERPRET IT IN THE WAY I HAVE INTERPRETED IT, WHICH HAPPENS TO BE GOVERNMENTAL POLICY.

Q WE SHOULD REINTERPRET INTERDICTION, DR. KISSINGER, SHOULDN'T WE? WHAT ABOUT INTERDICTION?

RM. KLEIN: LET ME GET TO A COUPLE OF OTHER PEOPLE AND WE WILL GET BACK TO YOU. I AM NOT TRYING TO AVOID YOUR POINT.

Q DR KISSINGER, GOING BACK TO VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW AND HIS STATEMENT ABOUT CAMBODIA, HE WAS ALSO REPORTED, I THINK BY AP, TO HAVE SAID THAT IF THE COMMUNISTS OVERRUN CAMBODIA THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM VIETNAM.

WOULD YOU CARE TO COMMENT ON THAT?

DR. KISSINGER: FIRST OF ALL, AGAIN, LET ME EXPLAIN THAT I HAVEN'T SEEN THE FULL TEXT OF WHAT HE SAID. BUT, LET ME EXPLAIN OUR READING OF THE SITUATION.

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FIRST, IT WOULDN'T BE THAT EASY FOR THE COMMUNISTS TO OVERRUN CAMBODIA. THEY HAVE TO MAKE A MAJOR REINFORCEMENT EFFORT BEFORE THEY CAN EVEN CONTEMPLATE DOING THAT.

SECONDLY, WE HAVE OUR DOUBTS THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WOULD PERMIT THE REOPENING OF THE PORT OF SIHANOUKVILLE, WHICH WOULD TAKE AWAY ONE OF THE SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS OF ANY SUCH MOVE, BECAUSE IT WOULD PREVENT THE SUPPLY BY SEA FROM THAT AREA.

THIRDLY, WHILE THE LOSS OF CAMBODIA, OR THE TRANSFORMATION OF CAMBODIA, OR EVEN EASTERN CAMBODIA INTO A COMMUNIST BASE AREA WOULD HAVE HAD DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES IN APRIL, WITH THE LOSS OF SANCTUARIES, THE STRENGTHENING OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE, AND WITH THE GAINS IN PACIFICATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN AS DISASTROUS AS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN THEN.

WE DO NOT FORESEE ANYTHING IN THE NEXT YEAR, OR UNTIL THE COMPLETION OF THE CURRENT PHASE OF OUR WITHDRAWAL, THAT WOULD AFFECT THIS PROGRAM.

NOW, THERE COULD BE SOMETHING OF A TOTALLY UNFORESEEN NATURE. BUT WE INTEND TO CARRY OUT THE WITHDRAWAL PROGRAM, AND I AM SURE THAT VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW INTENDED TO PUT THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA INTO THE CONTEXT OF THE WHOLE OPERATION GOING BACK TO APRIL.

MR. KLEIN: I MIGHT SAY THAT IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE COMMENTS WE ARE REFERRING TO HERE ARE ONES IN SOME TYPE OF COMMENT WITH THE PRESS ITSELF ON THE AIRPLANE EN ROUTE BETWEEN GUAM AND SOUTH KOREA, SO THAT THIS WOULD BE THE REASON THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE TEXT ON THIS.

Q THE LAND REFORM MOVEMENT IS JUDGED BY MANY AS ONE OF THE KEYS TO PEACE IN VIETNAM. BUT IT SEEMS AS THOUGH THERE IS A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED IN SOME QUARTERS THAT MR. HABIB AND THE PEACE DELEGATION IN PARIS, AS WELL AS THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, DON'T SEE EYE TO EYE WITH THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LAND REFORM MOVEMENT.

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DOES THE WHITE HOUSE CONSIDER THE LAND REFORM ACT THAT WAS
PASSED IN SAIGON AS BEING VITAL?

DR. KISSINGER: JUST FOR MY INFORMATION, WHO IS ON WHAT SIDE
OF THAT ARGUMENT?

Q THE GROUP THAT WENT OVER ---

DR. KISSINGER: NO, I MEAN IS MR. HABIB SUPPOSED TO BE MORE
EAGER THAN THE WHITE HOUSE?

Q LESS EAGER.

DR. KISSINGER: LESS EAGER FOR LAND REFORM? ARE WE ON THE
GOOD SIDE OF ONE ARGUMENT? WHAT ARE YOUR PEOPLE DOING, MR.
SISCO? (LAUGHTER)

I FRANKLY DON'T KNOW WHAT THE OPINION OF HABIB IS ON THE LAND
REFORM SITUATION NOW. I KNEW IT WHEN HE WAS POLITICAL
COUNSELLOR IN SAIGON. AT THAT TIME HE WAS STRONGLY FOR IT.

AS FAR AS THE WHITE HOUSE IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE PUSHED THE
LAND REFORM POLICY EVER SINCE PRESIDENT THIEU AND PRESIDENT
NIXON MET AT MIDWAY LAST YEAR, ON WHICH OCCASION PRESIDENT
THIEU INDICATED TO US THAT HE WOULD CARRY OUT A MAJOR LAND
REFORM PROGRAM, WHICH HE LATER INTRODUCED WITHIN A MONTH, AND
THEN WHICH HAD RATHER TOUGH PASSAGE THROUGH THE SENATE IN
SAIGON.

IT WAS PASSED, I THINK, IN MARCH. AND I AM NOT AWARE THAT
THERE IS ANY ELEMENT OF THE AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY OR OF THE
TOP LEVEL OF THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON THAT IS OPPOSED TO IT.

THERE ARE, OF COURSE, SOME VESTED INTERESTS IN SAIGON THAT
WOULD LIKE TO PUT OFF THE EVIL DAY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. BUT
THIS HAPPENS TO BE NOT ONE OF THE ISSUES ON WHICH I AM AWARE
OF ANY DISAGREEMENT WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT.

MR. KLEIN: AS A MATTER OF FACT, AS HENRY SAYS, ONE OF THE
INTERESTING THINGS IS WHEN YOU GET ON THE OTHER SIDE AND
READ A NUMBER OF THINGS ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING AT THE
WHITE HOUSE

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Q WE WERE TALKING AT THE TABLE AT LUNCH WITH RON ZIEGLER ABOUT WHAT INTERDICTION MEANS NOW.

MR. ZIEGLER: HERE IS ONE TIME HENRY KISSINGER CAN CLARIFY MY STATEMENT. (LAUGHTER)

Q IT SEEMS TO ME THERE IS A VERY GREAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID IN THE INITIAL STAGES ON CAMBODIA AND WHAT WE ARE NOW DOING WITH THE AIRPLANES. INTERDICTION SO FAR AS I KNOW MEANS CUTTING OF THE SUPPLY LINES COMING DOWN FROM NORTH VIETNAM.

NOW IT SEEMS TO ME WE ARE USING THE PLANES IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE 46,000 TROOPS, SUPPORT FOR TACTICAL ACTIONS. IS THAT RIGHT OR NOT?

DR. KISSINGER: OF WHOSE 46,000 TROOPS?

Q THE CAMBODIANS?

THAT IS WRONG ABOUT THE TROOPS. I AM SORRY, YOU ARE RIGHT ABOUT THAT.

DR. KISSINGER: I UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION.

Q I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MANY SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS THERE ARE AND WHETHER WE ARE SUPPORTING THEM TACTICALLY WITH THE AIRPLANES?

DR. KISSINGER: WE ARE NOT SUPPORTING THEM. THE MISSION OF OUR AIR FORCE IS INTERDICTION. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IN CARRYING OUT THE INTERDICTION THEY MAY HAVE COLLATERAL BENEFITS THAT ALSO HELP COMBAT OPERATIONS.

THE SUPPLY LINES OBVIOUSLY ALL RUN THROUGH POPULATION CENTERS AND MANY OF THE COMMUNIST ATTACKS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TOWARDS POPULATION CENTERS. SO IT ISN'T ALWAYS EASY TO DRAW AN ABSOLUTE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERDICTION MISSIONS AND COMBAT SUPPORT MISSIONS, BUT THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF OUR AIR FORCE IN CAMBODIA IS TO INTERDICT THE SUPPLIES THAT ARE COMING DOWN FROM NORTH VIETNAM.

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THERE IS ONE ADDITIONAL PROBLEM. AFTER OUR INCURSION INTO THE SANCTUARIES, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE MOVED THEIR SUPPLY LINES FURTHER WEST; THAT IS, PREVIOUSLY, THEY FOLLOWED THE HOE CHI MINH TRAIL, AND NOW THEY ARE SENDING MUCH OF IT DOWN PARALLEL TO OR ALONG THE SEKONG AND MEKONG RIVERS. THIS HAS MEANT THAT OUR INTERDICTION EFFORT HAS HAD TO FOLLOW THEM ABOUT 100 MILES FURTHER WEST. BUT THE MISSION OF OUR AIR FORCE IS INTERDICTION.

IF ANY CLOSE SUPPORT IS FLOWN DELIBERATELY, THAT IS ASSIGNED TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE. IT CAN HAPPEN, OF COURSE, THAT INTERDICTION MISSIONS HELP COMBAT OPERATIONS, BUT THAT IS NOT THE NORMAL PROCEDURE.

I WANT TO ADD JUST ONE QUICK WORD TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION. I AM LITERALLY NOT CONSCIOUS OF ANY DISAGREEMENT ON THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM THAT HAS COME TO THE PRESIDENT. THERE MAY BE SOME LOW-LEVEL THINGS THAT I AM NOT AWARE OF, BUT I HAVE NOT HEARD THAT THERE IS ANY DISAGREEMENT WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ON THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM.

Q YOU SPOKE THIS MORNING ABOUT THE SINO-RUSSIAN PROBLEM PERHAPS NOT BEING PRIMARY FOR 10 OR 15 YEARS, THAT IS, CHINA'S RISE. WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE ROLE OF JAPAN IN 10 OR 15 YEARS, WHEN CHINA HAS, POSSIBLY, ATTAINED THIS, AS YOU SAID, GREAT POWER STATUS? DOESN'T JAPAN'S ROLE AFFECT THAT FUTURE 10 OR 15 YEARS?

DR. KISSINGER: WELL, NOW, I SAID THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT IS PRIMARY TODAY. WHAT I SAID IS THAT THE CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCE IS NOT ENOUGH TO THREATEN THE SOVIET FORCE, EVEN IF THE SOVIETS STOPPED BUILDING ADDITIONAL MISSILES. THAT WILL TAKE THE CHINESE, OH, AT LEAST 15, 20 YEARS BEFORE THEY CAN GET A FORCE OF THE MAGNITUDE THAT THE SOVIETS NOW HAVE.

NOW, JAPAN, OF COURSE, HAS TODAY ALREADY AN INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY FAR IN EXCESS OF CHINA. THEY PRODUCE MORE WITH 100 MILLION PEOPLE THAN CHINA DOES WITH 800 MILLION, AND IN TERMS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY, JAPAN HAS THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHENEVER IT DECIDES TO DO SO.

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SO, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, JAPAN IS GOING TO BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE FAR EAST. INDEED, ONE OF THE REASONS WHY WE MADE SO GENEROUS A SETTLEMENT WITH THEM ON OKINAWA LAST YEAR WAS OUR CONVICTION THAT WE HAD A CHOICE BETWEEN HOLDING ONTO THE BASE ON OKINAWA FOR TWO OR THREE YEARS LONGER, OR CREATING THE BASIS FOR A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN. WE CHOSE THE LATTER, BECAUSE IF HISTORY PROVES ANYTHING, IT IS THAT YOU CANNOT HOLD ONTO A BASE AGAINST THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE INVOLVED, AND USE IT IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY.

ALSO, WE FIND NOW IN THE CHINESE, AND TO SOME EXTENT IN THE SOVIET LITERATURE, INCREASING REFERENCES TO JAPAN BECOMING ONE OF THE MAJOR FACTORS IN THE FAR EAST, AND OF THE ALLEGED COLLUSION BETWEEN US AND THE JAPANESE TO PUSH THEM MORE INTO THE FRONT LINE.

TO THE EXTENT THAT CHINA BECOMES A MAJOR COUNTRY, THE JAPANESE MAY HAVE AN INCENTIVE TO DO MORE FOR THEMSELVES. I HAVE TO ADD, THOUGH, ONE PROVISO, AND THIS IS A POINT I SHOULD HAVE MADE THIS MORNING IN MY DISCUSSION ABOUT VIETNAM. IT IS THIS: IF JAPAN SHOULD BECOME CONVINCED THAT THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WILL BECOME THE DOMINANT COUNTRIES IN ASIA, THEN WE HAVE TO EXPECT THAT THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF JAPAN MAY SHIFT AS DRAMATICALLY AS IT HAS ALREADY TWICE IN THIS CENTURY.

AFTER ALL, THEY SHIFTED FROM FUEDALISM TO EMPEROR-WORSHIP AFTER ADMIRAL PERRY OPENED UP JAPAN, AND THEY SHIFTED FROM EMPEROR-WORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY AFTER THEY LOST WORLD WAR II. IN NEITHER CASE CAN YOU REALLY SAY THAT IT WAS PHILOSOPHICAL CONVICTION THAT PRODUCED THE CHANGE.

THEREFORE, IF JAPAN SHOULD DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE UNITED STATES, FOR WHATEVER REASON, IS NO LONGER A FACTOR TO BE RECKONED WITH IN ASIA, THEN JAPAN HAS TWO CHOICES: IT CAN EITHER TRY TO CARRY THE LOAD THAT WE DID, IN WHICH CASE WE MIGHT SEE A RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE MILITARISM, OR IT MIGHT TRY TO JOIN FORCES WITH THESE OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, IN WHICH CASE WE MIGHT ALSO SEE A GROWTH OF JAPANESE MILITARY POWER, BUT MORE OVERTLY DIRECTED AGAINST US.

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ALONE, IT IS QUITE IMPORTANT FOR US TO REMAIN A PACIFIC POWER, OR TO REMAIN INTERESTED IN ASIA, SO THAT JAPAN PURSUES COMPATIBLE POLICIES WITH OURS, AND STILL FEELS SHELTERED TO SOME EXTENT BY THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE, SO THEY DON'T DECIDE TO GO IT ALONE. BECAUSE THEY CERTAINLY HAVE THE INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY TO GO IT ALONE. THEY ARE THE THIRD LARGEST INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION ALREADY IN THE WORLD. JOHNSON

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